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I n the context of non-international armed conflict operations there are different situations that I think are most important to consider in order to identify the 
applicable law concerning environmental protection. 
First of all, we must distinguish between non-international armed conflict 
operations taking place with or without external intervention. 
A traditional internal armed conflict, as defined by Article 1 of Additional 
Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions of 1949,1 is one in which there is no 
participation of external armed forces. An internal armed conflict, to be classified 
as such, must involve a confrontation, with a certain level of intensity, of regular 
armed forces against insurgents or belligerents of that same country. If a certain 
level ofintensity in the use offorce is not present, Protocol II would not apply. In 
that case, Article 3 common to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions2 would be 
operative. 
In all those particular situations, the applicable law for the protection of the 
environment during an internal armed conflict will, in principle, be no other than 
domestic law. 
In that context, it might be possible to assume that in a certain country there 
are no specific developments of internal law to regulate the protection of the 
environment during armed conflicts or, that the applicable law contains lacunae 
on that particular issue. It could also be assumed that basic principles of 
environmental law have not been enforced within that particular country or even 
made to be applicable during time of peace. 
In those extreme situations, and on a residual basis, we could assume that an 
international customary rule expressing the duty of every State not to damage 
other States and/or areas beyond national jurisdiction, should apply. 
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In his paper, Rear Admiral Harlow clearly stated the present status of 
environmental law principles applicable to relations among States in time of peace. 
We do agree that the scope and reach of that set of principles determine the basic 
rules which regulate and restrict the use offorce by a State within an internal armed 
conflict vis-a.-vis third States. 
After all, the relations between a State in which an internal armed conflict is 
taking place, and any other State, are governed by international law applicable 
during time of peace. 
On the same line of thought, we also consider that insurgents or belligerents, 
that fight against regular armed forces of a State, are also obliged to observe that 
basic duty not to damage other States or areas beyond national jurisdiction. 
Although Article 1 of Additional Protocol II establishes for all parties to the 
internal conflict the obligation to observe the laws prescribed by it, we should 
admit that this obligation not to damage the environment of other States is a 
customary obligation addressed to States, not to insurgents or belligerents in a 
non-international armed conflict. 
The problem will remain; whose responsibility has been affected in cases where 
insurgent forces, having produced environmental damage to a third State or to an 
area beyond the national jurisdiction, are finally defeated? 
In general terms, it could be accepted that the State in which territory an 
internal armed conflict has taken place would have a double obligation. First, not 
to use its forces in such a way that could affect third States' environmental interests, 
and, second, to impede such effects being produced by insurgents or belligerents 
engaged in an internal armed conflict. 
A second situation that needs to be distinguished within internal armed 
conflicts is one in which there is an intervention, whether by direct or indirect 
involvement, of a third State. If such intervention, in one way or another, involves 
the use of force by third States, that will constitute the necessary condition for the 
internationalization of the conflict. 
The environmental protection rules applicable in such a situation would be no 
other than the ones derived from international humanitarian law enforced during 
international or internationalized armed conflicts. 
A second alternative related to non-international armed conflict operations 
where there is third party intervention, is related to peace-keeping operations 
authorized by international or regional organizations. In cases of peace-keeping 
operations performed within an internal armed conflict, there is a peculiar 
relationship of third parties to the conflict in which they intervene. 
First of all, peace-keeping operations would not constitute a use of force that 
would cause the internationalization of the conflict per se. Peace-keepers are not 
intended to be involved in combat and it is supposed that they will not be. In that 
sense, there would be very few and extreme cases in which damage to the 
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environment could be justified on the basis of military necessity by peace-keeping 
forces. 
The main issue here is that peace-keeping operations will qualify as operations 
other than war within an internal armed conflict in which both sides of the conflict 
will be performing acts of war. That particular situation leads us to consider the 
possibility of a mixed situation in which the applicable law will differ depending 
upon who is undertaking actions amounting to the use of force. 
One general consideration about the applicable law in this particular situation 
might be that peace-keeping operations that are authorized by international 
organizations will internationalize the conflict. That would be to say that the mere 
intervention of peace-keepers within an internal armed conflict will generate new 
obligations on internal belligerents. 
Although peace-keeping operations are a form of lawful international 
intervention, it does not follow from that presumption that international 
humanitarian law applicable to international or internationalized armed conflicts 
should apply. 
It is clear that peace-keeping operations infringe on the principle of absolute 
sovereignty of States and, most obviously, its corollary, non-intervention in 
domestic affairs. 
It is also clear that the obligations of peace-keepers, in performing operations 
other than war in relation to an internal armed conflict, are stricter than 
obligations of domestic or internal belligerents. In principle, both sides to the 
conflict are acting within the territory of one single State. They are in a certain 
way within "their own territory." 
Colonel Burger, in his paper, clearly expressed the obligations of peace-keepers 
involved in an internal armed conflict that are derived either from conventional 
arrangements or from their own rules of engagement. It is important to realize that 
whether through treaty obligations or through internal imposition, armed forces 
participating in peace-keeping operations are bound to respect certain 
environmental premises in conducting their actions. 
As suggested above, the question remains whether the mere presence of 
peace-keeping forces in an internal armed conflict will generate new obligations 
on belligerent parties to that internal conflict. 
Those problems lead us to propose that, in protecting the environment during 
non-international armed conflict operations, we differentiate between those 
circumstances involving the use of force in military operations other than war 
(MOOTW) and those that do not. 
Military operations other than war could be performed during 
non-international armed conflicts by peace-keeping forces, but that specific 
category of operations also has application outside non-international armed 
conflicts. 
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Military operations other than war will then include, a) peace-keeping 
operations and b) operations involving the use of force performed in compliance 
with international law in time of peace. 
The situation in the former-Yugoslavia, commented on in Colonel Burger's 
paper, is not a clear example of non-international armed conflict operations, due 
to the actual and non-disputed international character of that conflict. But at the 
same time, peace-keeping operations in the former-Yugoslavia qualify as military 
operations other than war. This is one of the main reasons why we propose the 
formulation of a clear distinction between internal armed conflict and MOOTW 
situations as a basic prerequisite for the definition of the applicable law concerning 
environmental protection. 
Governmental arrangements, as well as specific rules of engagement, would 
determine the proper framework within which to use force in compliance with 
environmental protection standards in or outside non-international armed 
conflicts. The main problem here is the unilateral character of the rules of 
engagement adopted by States in observance of domestic policies. 
In reference to MOOTW performed in strict compliance with international law 
in time of peace, we should include, as another example, the force that an 
individual State is authorized to use in observing fisheries stocks conservation 
measures within its exclusive economic zone and beyond that zone on the adjacent 
high seas, in conformity with the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea3 and the latest developments of the law incorporated into the U.N. Draft 
Convention on the conservation and management of straddling fish stocks and 
highly migratory fish stocks and other protected species.4 
For all those situations involving MOOTW, the applicable law concerning the 
protection of the environment would be no other than international law standards. 
There is no doubt that international law will specifically be applied in areas beyond 
the national jurisdiction of the State performing MOOTW. But we also could argue 
that general principles of environmental protection law, as described in Rear 
Admiral Harlow's paper, also limit individual States in the conduct of MOOTW 
taking place within their own territory. 
For all the above considerations, we are prompted to conclude that: MOOTW 
performed by a State within its own territory are governed, in respect to 
environmental protection, by its own domestic law, whatever the degree of 
development of that law might be. Obviously, there are two basic international 
limitations in performing those military operations. The first limitation, as we 
have already stated above, is derived from the duty not to damage other States and 
areas beyond national jurisdiction. The second limitation specifically relates to 
non-international armed conflicts of certain intensity. 
For the latter situations, Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions of 
19495 should be applied. Parties involved in the use of force during 
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non-international armed conflicts are obliged to protect the environment as a 
collateral obligation to protect civilian resources necessary for the survival of the 
civilian population. (As mentioned in Rear Admiral Harlow's paper, Articles 14 
and 15 of Additional Protocol II would apply here.) 
Along the same line, MOOTW performed in third States' territories or in areas 
beyond national jurisdiction, will be governed, in relation to environmental 
protection issues, by international law standards. 
I think that it would go too far to suggest, at the present time, that the law has 
created an environmental legal protection scheme binding upon all States during 
non-international armed conflict, when in peace time the same environment is 
subject to no protection or control. 
When a State is acting within its own territory, the principle of 
non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other States would be a legal barrier 
for environmental protection claims, except when there is entitlement to damage 
reparations or entitlement to stop or prevent future damages produced, or expected 
to be produced, in third States' territories or in areas beyond national jurisdiction. 
Additional Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions does not protect the 
environmentper se, but as a collateral effect from the protection of natural resources 
necessary for the survival of the civilian population. 
Concerning the development of the law applicable to the protection of the 
environment during MOOTW performed either during non-international armed 
conflicts or in time of peace, we consider that emerging rules have been inferred 
from general and basic principles of international humanitarian law. 
The protection of civilian property, as well as the limitations on means and 
methods of war-principles adopted by the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 
19076 -have been the starting point for future developments inspired on a growing 
international conscience that interrelates rules regarding the selection of targets 
and restrictions on the production of collateral damage, with the protection of the 
environment as a manifestation of individual rights to preserve a tolerable human 
habitat for future generations. 
This human rights element has strengthened internal as well as international 
political interests in preserving adequate environmental conditions as a common 
obligation of all States. 
At the international level, the existence of recognized principles establishing 
an affirmative duty for all States to protect and conserve the environment is beyond 
question. There is also a generalized consensus on the obligation of States to 
observe adequate legal protection against unnecessary environmental damage 
during armed conflicts. As referred to by Rear Admiral Harlow, that obligation 
has been expressed as a duty upon States to take necessary measures, to the extent 
practicable under the circumstances, to not cause significant damage to other 
States or areas beyond national jurisdiction. 
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There is a strong commitment among academicians and politicians in different 
parts of the world to extend these international commitments to foster adequate 
legal protection of the environment to situations not necessarily reached within 
the framework of international law. Although we agree with the aims of such a 
proposition, we have to recognize that, in reference to MOOTW, that is just a 
manifestation of lege ferenda. 
Even considering that all those efforts have already produced certain positive 
effects, we must recognize that at the present time international law has no specific 
rules to protect the environment in relation to military operations other than war 
or with respect to the use of force during a non-international armed conflict. 
As an exception, actual practices of U.N. peace-keeping forces have 
contemplated environmental protection standards in performing MOOTW. But 
we should also recognize that those commitments are the direct consequence of 
either special international agreements or of rules of engagement defined and 
imposed at the national level. 
Taking into account the recent experiences of NATO, the U.N., and individual 
States in the former-Yugoslavia, referred to in Colonel Burger's paper, it is 
important to identify new trends in the law which hopefully will inspire national 
legislatures to adopt common domestic standards on environmental protection 
when defining rules of engagements for MOOTW. 
That recent experience allows us to conclude that adoption at the national level 
of appropriate rules of engagement will be a most appropriate way to implement 
and enforce developing international standards concerning environmental 
protection during MOOTW, either in non-international armed conflicts or when 
MOOTW are performed by States in time of peace. 
Although those international trends towards environmental protection, as 
extensively commented on in the papers of Rear Admiral Harlow and Colonel 
Burger, are for most countries still in a very primitive stage, we may at least have 
some hope that through the generation of domestic awareness, certain 
approximation of lege ferenda to lege lata will be accomplished in the near future. 
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